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
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PRUSSIA AND THE EVOLUTION
OF THE RESERVE ARMY:
-A FORGOTTEN LESSON OF HISTORY

Wilbur E. Gray



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Wilbur E. Gray

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
FOREWORD

The U.S. Army has long had an interest in European military power. From the very founding of the Republic, American leaders have looked to Europe for the perfect model from which to create our own military institutions. This has been particularly true concerning Prussia, the land of Frederick the Great and precursor of modern Germany. After Prussia's stunning victory over France in the Franco-Prussian War, Americans from Emory Upton until Albert Wedemeyer looked at the German military machine as the epitome of efficiency and professionalism. For an American military disgusted with its minor role in a post-Civil War nation, the German military represented the best of what could be. It was no coincidence that U.S. Army dress uniforms of the late 19th century sported spiked helmets, quite similar in appearance to a Prussian *pickelhaube*.

The tragedy of World War II soon changed the American attitude towards the German military from admiration to revulsion. It was not until the cold war, with Federal Germany's entry into NATO, that opinions began to moderate. And now, in the 1990's, an age of diminished resources, we find that the Prussian army still has much to teach.

In this monograph the author explores yet another aspect of the Prussian army, the use of mobilizable reserves as the foundation of its military power. Forced by defeat to rely on reserve and militia forces to rebuild their army, the Prussians created a reserve system that allowed them to field a world class military force at a cost their small, economically strapped state could afford. With detail, yet brevity, the author examines how this highly successful "reserve army" came to be, noting both good and bad aspects of the system, and their possible impact on the U.S. Army today. Indeed, the implications for modern force planners are obvious.

Above all, however, the author shows once again how critical an understanding of the past is for soldiers to prepare for the future. It is with that in mind that the Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this historical report.



GARY L. GUERTNER
Acting Director
Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MAJOR WILBUR E. GRAY is a Virginia National Guardsman serving with the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, as a Strategic Research Analyst. A graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Major Gray holds bachelor's degrees in history and political science from Clemson University and a master's degree in international relations from the University of Southern California. A military intelligence officer in the Active/Guard Reserve program, he has had numerous active duty assignments, to include a tour with the 1st Armored Division in Germany. He has also served with the 29th Infantry Division(L), VA ARNG. His most recent assignment was as Associate Professor of Military Science, University of Virginia.

PRUSSIA AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE RESERVE ARMY: A FORGOTTEN LESSON OF HISTORY

Introduction.

"It just shouldn't have happened like this!" We don't know who exactly muttered these words on September 1, 1870, when the remnants of nearly 124,000 crack French troops surrendered to the Germans at the ancient city of Sedan. Perhaps it was Napoleon III, the Emperor of France, who personally surrendered after vainly trying to get himself killed in combat. Perhaps it was the French commander, Marshal Marie Edme Patrice de MacMahon. It could have easily been any private or lieutenant in France's shattered Army of Chalons. And if the embarrassment of surrender weren't enough, the German Army to which the capitulation was made was not an army of fellow military professionals, but an army of damned reservists and militiamen! "How could this have happened?" wondered many French soldiers.

Sedan, the climatic battle of the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), was more than just a military disaster for France. It was the culmination of a clash between two entirely different military systems. MacMahon's French Army of Chalons was radically different in many respects from Prussian Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke's Army of the North German Confederation. The most glaring difference remembered by historians is the superiority of the Prussian General Staff and its command and control system over that of France. Remembered too are the differences in technology, such as the superiority of the German's breech loading Krupp field guns over France's muzzle loaders. Glossed over, sadly, is the subject of people. The Franco-Prussian War saw the well-trained, battle hardened, professional armies of France go toe-to-toe with the armies of the German states, led by powerful Prussia. The Prussian army was unique in that its very foundation of power lay in a structure that demanded the

large scale mobilization of reserve and militia soldiers. In the harsh courtroom of combat. Prussia's reserve system had proven superior.

This neglected fact may have more relevance than ever before for the U.S. Army. Faced with downsizing due to the end of the cold war, force planners must contend with developing an American army that will offer the biggest bang for a continually shrinking buck. In this planning atmosphere will inevitably arise the question of how to use the Reserve Components (the U.S. Army Reserve and the Army National Guard) in the Army's overall military strategy. Clearly, Reserve Component units offer an economical alternative to their more expensive Active counterparts. Questions remain, however, on the ability of the Reserves and National Guard to meet established standards of combat proficiency soon after mobilization. In the wake of such concerns, the experience of 19th century Prussia deserves another look. When one considers that the Prussian army, like our own, was designed for national power projection, as opposed to just regional defense, a relook becomes even more enticing. The next several pages provide this examination of the Prussian reserve system, both good and bad aspects, in order to present force planners with at least one more alternative for the future.

Collapse and Rebirth.

Ironically, the Prussian reserve system was born out of a Prussian military disaster at the hands of France, namely the battle of Jena-Auerstadt (October 14, 1806). Dr Richard Gabriel, a military historian at the U.S. Army War College, frankly noted, "Before Jena-Auerstadt people wondered if the current Prussian army was still the army of Frederick the Great. The answer was a resounding 'yes' and this was the whole problem!"¹ The Prussian army, totally professional, parade ground pretty, ruthlessly disciplined and steeped in the tradition of the great Frederick, proved to be no match for the flexible French armies under Napoleon I. In the three weeks that followed the twin defeats of Jena-Auerstadt, the French managed to bag 250 standards, 800 field cannon and nearly 140,000 prisoners.² As Prince Joachim Murat, Napoleon's

flamboyant cavalry commander, wryly put it, "The combat ends for lack of combatants."³ With Prussia out of the way, Napoleon then turned and sacked a reinforcing Russian army, nearly destroying it in mass at the battle of Friedland (June 14, 1807).

The conquest of Prussia and defeat of her army in battle was not enough to satisfy Napoleon, however. The French Emperor also remembered the legacy of Frederick the Great and desired to ensure that Prussia would never again pose a military threat. The terms dictated to the Prussians at the Convention of Paris (September 8, 1808) were militarily harsh. Prussia's 220,000 man army was to be permanently reduced to a mere 42,000, of which 22,000 could be infantry.⁴ A mere 36 battalions of infantry remained out of the 175 that Prussia fielded previously. The cavalry fared little better, being reduced from 38 regiments to 19. The artillery was also reduced proportionally. Despite the severity of these reductions, however, the once mighty Prussian army was merely down, not out.

Prussian General Gerhard Johan von Scharnhorst, the Army Adjutant General, was one of a number of officers charged by King Frederick William II to find out what was wrong with Prussia's army and fix it. Among the many reforms recommended, Scharnhorst's solution to the calamity of expected force reductions came in a memorandum published July 31, 1807, a few weeks after the Treaty of Tilsit formally ended hostilities between France and Prussia (as well as Prussia's tardy allies, the Russians). He proposed establishing a system where every infantry company would yearly furlough 20 of its senior and older soldiers. At the same time this company would receive 20 recruits as replacements. The cycle would continue year after year and had the effect of placing the most experienced soldiers into a reserve status. The reasoning was that these individuals would need little training upon mobilization, to the extent that they could be used as cadre for new units as well. Scharnhorst believed that a trained and mobilizable reserve of some 17,000 men would be available after about 3 years if this system were adopted. Only infantry was considered in Scharnhorst's scheme, as the training required of cavalry and artillerymen could not be

maintained as easily under such a system, and also because mandatory reductions in these arms were not expected to be as severe as for the foot soldiers. In any case, this program came to be known as the *Kruemper* (from a German word meaning to "crumple") system.⁵

Surprisingly, the use of military reserves was not new to the Prussian army. Scharnhorst took his ideas from one Colonel von Below who had used a similar system in his own regiment since 1805.⁶ In fact, a similar "furlough" system had been discussed as far back as the reign of Frederick the Great. There were several reasons why these schemes were not implemented fully, however. The first was a simple fear of revolt against the Prussian throne if the general population was armed and trained in military matters. A second reason was the fact that the 18th century mind did not perceive war as a matter in which the general population should be involved. War was the final argument of kings, not of their people. To suggest otherwise was to imply that the people had the right of approval or disapproval over national military policy—truly unthinkable. A reserve system could lead to such an involvement by the general masses. Finally there was the question of time. When such matters as a reserve system surfaced again in 1787, there simply wasn't enough time to implement such a program before the Napoleonic thunderbolt hit. The world renowned lethargy of the Prussian court exacerbated matters.

Defeat in 1806, however, removed all arguments and Scharnhorst's *Kruemper* system was quickly adopted. Prussian King Frederick William II and his advisors realized that the country had little other choice given the treaty obligations forced upon them. Also the humiliation of the 1806 campaign provided the atmosphere where any reform was seriously considered as a viable alternative to the past. Further, the *Kruemper* system had the advantage of not only being in accordance with the Convention of Paris, but also of being of such a nature that it did not attract undue attention. As no new military units were actually raised for service to the Prussian crown, it is not surprising that the watchful French allowed the system to continue almost without interruption.

Continue it did and the *Kruemper* system proved enormously successful. There were problems in the beginning, of course. A report issued on May 10, 1810, stated that of 22,380 *Kruemper* soldiers available, only 11,213 were fit for duty. Changes were made to correct this problem and, as war between France and Prussia grew more likely, the number that each infantry company was allowed to furlough and replace grew dramatically. By the end of 1811, there were 31,259 furloughed soldiers fit for field duty and a further 8,410 fit for garrison responsibilities. Prussia's mandatory support for Napoleon's invasion of Russia took many of the *Kruemper* producing battalions out of production. Nevertheless, by October 1812, the number of furloughed soldiers fit for field duty was up to 33,337 while those fit for garrison service stood at 3,087. This, in effect, allowed the Prussians an infantry force more than double that allowed by treaty.⁷

The acid test for the *Kruemper* system came after Napoleon's disastrous retreat from Russia. With the decimation of the French field army, Prussia saw the chance for both an alliance with the Russians, and the opportunity to strike at the French while they were still weak. Lieutenant General Hans David Ludwig von Yorck, commander of Napoleon's Prussian contingent in Russia, had already taken the first step in the Convention of Tauroggen (December 30, 1812).⁸ This agreement with the Russians declared Yorck's contingent to be neutral and not subject to further orders from the French. King Frederick William completed the process by formally declaring war on France on March 16, 1813.⁹ Prior to this, the *Kruemper* system's wartime action plan had already been implemented to increase the size of the army.

The first increase in the size of the Prussian army was ordered by the King as soon as the Convention of Tauroggen was made public. This increase ordered the establishment of a reserve battalion of 801 men for each of the army's line infantry regiments. Theoretically, these were to consist of two thirds *Kruemper* and one third recruits. While some battalions were only able to form with one half of their men as *Kruemper*, some formations were able to do much better. Lieutenant General Frederick William von Buelow, for example, took the

cadres of the depot (training) battalions of the 2d through 4th East Prussian Line Infantry Regiments to form three reserve battalions, all fully manned by *Kruemper* soldiers. On February 1, 1813, a further increase in the size of the army was ordered. Seventeen more reserve battalions were formed, each of 801 men of which 85 were cadre drawn from the regular line regiments, and the rest *Kruemper*. The reserve battalions were initially attached to each of the line infantry regiments, but the armistice of August 1813 allowed the Prussians to reorganize. The reserve formations were formed into 12 reserve regiments, each consisting of three battalions. Normally, one reserve regiment was made organic to each Prussian infantry brigade (a three regiment formation nearly the size of a division). By all available accounts the reserve regiments performed admirably, so much so that in March 1815 they were redesignated as permanent line regiments (numbers 13 through 24).¹⁰

The *Kruemper*-based reserve regiments were not the only way the Prussian army was figuratively raised from the dead. On March 17, 1813, King Frederick William formally authorized the establishment of the Prussian *Landwehr* (provincial militia), effectively instituting the French *levee en masse* in his own country.¹¹ The idea of a state militia had been supported by Scharnhorst and a host of other reformers for years as they saw the concept as a permanent fix to many of the army's problems. For example, one of the most damning indictments against the Prussian army by Scharnhorst was that its soldiers lacked the electrifying enthusiasm of the French. The French was an army of citizens who were fighting for a cause in which they truly believed and in a war in which they had a specific stake in the outcome. The Prussian army, on the other hand, was an army consisting of mercenaries and the very dregs of Prussian citizenry. Such an army was only held together by the whip and this did nothing to develop *esprit de corps*. Further, the Prussian army, and war in general, was regarded as an instrument of the king—not the nation or its people. British historian F.N. Maude noted of the 1806 debacle:

The public opinion of the Prussian masses, as opposed to the Prussian Court and Army, was by no means the blaze of indignation

which the fate of its very near neighbors might have been expected to evoke, for they were still under an illusion that War was merely a struggle between Governments, carried out with all possible respect for private interests, and it seemed to them a matter of indifference whether a few more hundred thousand fellow countrymen passed under the French yoke or remained under that of their own Monarch.¹²

The reformers declared that this total disassociation of the army from the *people* for whom it fought had been the greatest military disaster of 1806. This disconnection, and its resulting lack of public support for the army or state policy, only amplified the lack of spirit among the soldiery, thus causing wretched field performance. Scharnhorst believed that the only way to correct this problem was to mobilize and arm the entire population, thereby permanently linking them with the military and state policy.¹³

The King, understandably, had been mortified at such a proposition. The idea of a nation in arms still brought forth thoughts of armed revolt against the throne, an unpleasant prospect in the mind of any autocrat. Yorck, however, forced the issue by establishing his own militia in the province of East Prussia shortly after the Convention of Tauroggen. Feeling that Yorck's actions left him no choice, the King followed suit in March. This decision was probably the salvation of the nation.

Unlike the reserve formations, both cavalry and infantry *Landwehr* units were formed. Recruits were drawn from all males between the ages of 18 and 45, though exemptions were given to priests, teachers, some civil servants, and married men or those with children.¹⁴ Drawing from the experience of Major General von Borstell, who had "unofficially" raised his own *Landwehr* in January, *Kruemper* soldiers were sometimes used as cadre for the new militia units.¹⁵ In a radical (and later regretted) bit of democracy, *Landwehr* units chose their sergeants by election. The provincial council chose junior officers (subject to royal approval) and recommended the choices for higher ranking officers.¹⁶

The *Landwehr* trained initially on two days a week (Wednesday and Sunday, so as not to disrupt the economy

too greatly) and after they received their equipment, in companies for a week, battalions for two more weeks and then in regiments for a further two weeks.¹⁷ Then off they went to war. Every Prussian infantry brigade included one *Landwehr* regiment (the other two being one line and one reserve regiment) and half of all corps cavalry was militia. The entire IV Corps, in fact, was composed of militia troops. At first, most of the soldiers were wretchedly uniformed and poorly equipped for battle. Some, in fact, carried pikes instead of firearms. This in itself was not a problem as captured French weapons soon became available and also because early losses among the militia were so high. The lack of experience meant high casualties and many militiamen simply fell out along the way. The journal of the 13th Silesian Regiment noted:

On these forced marches, the consequences of the extremely poor clothing of the militia became apparent. Largely without greatcoats, in simple linen trousers, barefoot since their shoes came off in the bottomless mud—even with the best will and with the strongest of constitution, how could these poor militiamen, being quite unaccustomed to such exertion, put up with this? It was three days since they last had more than a mouthful of bread, as the damp spoiled the small stocks; there was even less brandy, too little to give the soldiers a ration. Filthy, exhausted, many fell to the ground, and more still would die as they had to stay behind in hospital, sick with fever.¹⁸

The *Landwehr* became much better, however, learning the art of war on the university of the battlefield and fighting side by side with the regulars until the final act of Waterloo (June 18, 1815). General Yorck, now the Prussian I Corps commander, at once lamented the fact that he had received four of the worst militia battalions imaginable. At the battle of Loewenburg (August 21, 1813) he changed his opinion based on the performance of a battalion of the 5th Silesian *Landwehr* Infantry Regiment. The battalion slugged it out with French regulars all day, twice throwing them back into the village of Plagwitz at bayonet point. When, their ammunition gone, they were finally withdrawn, General Yorck ordered every regular line unit they passed to snap to attention and present arms. After the battle of Wartenburg (October 3, 1813), General August Niethardt von Gneisenau seconded Yorck's opinion of

the militia when he wrote, "These young troops teach themselves how to fight. I only hope our commanders can make proper use of such a spirit in the army."¹⁹

Spirit was the operational term in the good general's remarks. Fulfilling what Scharnhorst and company had predicted, the establishment of the *Landwehr* provided the necessary military enthusiasm by creating in essence a Prussian *national* army. Unlike the musket carrying automatons of 1806, the *Landwehr* produced an army of the people, as the militia's mobilization literally touched every family and community within the Prussian state. This secured near immediate public support for the state's war policy and the hometown soldiers who were to execute it. This support in turn helped create an atmosphere within the army where the troops felt a sense of responsibility to the people and were willing to fight viciously to uphold it. As Scharnhorst (tragically killed in action in 1813) had hoped, the army and the public were fused into a single entity, far more powerful than the former professional force that served the King alone.

The militia's mobilization also allowed the Prussians to field an unexpectedly large army at a minimum cost. With the addition of nearly 120,000 *Landwehr* (some 38 infantry and 30 cavalry regiments), the Prussian army numbered over 280,000. This was some six percent of Prussia's population and an unimaginable burden without the kind of total mobilization envisioned by Scharnhorst. To the Prussian generals who watched the parade of the *Landwehr* through Paris after Waterloo, this single fact precluded a return to the professional force known in the era of Frederick the Great. The fact this army of "citizens" had been ultimately successful against history's greatest soldier reinforced the notion that the future of the Prussian military lay in the strength of mobilizable reserves.²⁰

Reorganization and Victory.

The victory over Napoleon permanently changed the nature of the Prussian army, unlike the other continental European powers who returned to military systems much like

those prior to the French Revolution. For Prussia, the manifestation of the change came in the form of two legal statutes. The first was the National Defense Act of September 3, 1814, which not only fixed the size of the standing army to but one percent of the country's population, but also implemented permanent universal military conscription.²¹ The second law was the *Landwehr* Law of November 21, 1815, a statute establishing the *Landwehr* as the principle reserve of the army and also organizing this militia as an entity separate from the army.²² The *Landwehr* was to be locally controlled, have its own territorial organization, and its officers were to be drawn from men of substance from the local community. The *Landwehr* also provided its own administration and training, the latter being two 14-day drill periods per year.²³ The concept behind the two laws was to provide Prussia with an army that was both large and economically affordable. The laws, particularly the *Landwehr* Law, also validated Scharnhorst's avowed aim to "raise and inspire the spirit of the Army, to bring the Army and the Nation into a more intimate union."²⁴ Being both a local institution and a military reserve, the *Landwehr* provided this link between army and populace.

In practice the system worked something like this. All Prussians capable of military service entered the regular army for 3 years at the age of 20, spending an additional 2 years in a small *Kruemper*-like reserve force, then 14 years in the *Landwehr*. The size of the regular force was 140,000 men; the reserve, 60,000; and the *Landwehr*, 260,000. Of the latter, some 3,000 acted as an active duty cadre, another 150,000 (the first levy, those 25 to 31 years of age) provided field combat units and a further 110,000 (the second levy, those 32 to 39 years of age) provided garrison troops. From an economic point of view the system produced an army of nearly 530,000 men of whom less than a quarter were ever on active service. Militarily, "the standing-army in time of peace was to be used more as a *School* to prepare the men for war—and in time of war to furnish but a small part (2/5) of the whole army."²⁵

This idea, that the army was *not* to fight the next war, but was to train the *nation* to fight the next war, should not be underemphasized! Though revolutionary, it was to be the

foundation of the German army until after the First World War. It was a system that was economically feasible, and it bound the people to the military through the necessity to use local reserve forces in nearly any conflict. Theoretically, the Prussians believed, when the reservist marched off to war, his hometown support marched with him.

This system fit Prussian military theory quite well. Senior Prussian military officials, as well as the King himself, had several serious problems with the physical arrangements, however, most concerning the status of the *Landwehr*. A primary complaint was simply that the militia was not as well trained or disciplined as the regular soldiers. The autumn maneuvers showed that there were indeed shortcomings in the performance of the *Landwehr*, and this brought a call from the regular army for more centralized control over the activities of the militia. The lack of prowess on the part of the *Landwehr* had its origins in several areas. For one, the economic weakness of the state led to the assignment to the *Landwehr* of soldiers, after only very sketchy training, who could not be accommodated by the regular army. The lack of funds also caused the reduction of drill time to one 14-day period per year. Finally, a number of *Landwehr* officers began to be recruited from among the *Einjährig-Freiwilliger*, a group of officers required to serve only one year of active duty because of their status as students of medicine or other professions. This lack of training invariably manifested itself in the form of poor leadership.²⁶

There was probably a more serious concern about the *Landwehr* among the senior Prussian military, however. This was the question of the militia's political reliability. While most Prussian officers recognized the *Landwehr*'s worth in mobilizing the national will in time of war, it soon became evident that this very fact gave the people a *de facto* outlet in which they could express their approval (or disapproval) about war policy itself. The *Landwehr* was an institution which belonged to the provinces and their people as opposed to the King. As an institution of the people, it could easily turn against the King's war policy when the people disagreed. For example, if a mobilization order went out, the *Landwehr* might not show

up at all. If they did, and the people did not fully support the King's policies, some Prussian officers were genuinely afraid of which way the militia might shoot.

This situation leads many historians to conclude that most of the *Landwehr*'s problems were contrived by the Prussian military. Contrived or not, the King was convinced enough to issue a decree in December 1819 that placed the militia under more regular army control. Some 34 *Landwehr* battalions were disbanded, local control was reduced, regular officers were assigned to all field commands, and combat formations were now incorporated directly into regular army units. A Prussian division, for example, consisted of a regular brigade, a *Landwehr* brigade, a cavalry brigade, plus artillery and technical troops. With such a fusion the Prussian military, and no doubt the King, hoped to not only increase combat efficiency, but also to expose the militia to the "proper" discipline and political views that traditionally had characterized the Prussian military. To the many reformers who had supported Scharnhorst, the changes meant that "the progress made towards a reconciliation between the army and civilian society would be reversed."²⁷

This situation remained constant within the Prussian military until 1848. In this year, reformist and pro-democracy revolutions sprang up all across Europe, to include the German states. The Prussian army was called upon to control this movement, not only in Prussia but in neighboring German states as well. In this endeavor the *Landwehr* proved indifferent at best. There were even occasions when the *Landwehr* physically opposed this military intervention, many of the units with surprising effectiveness. This rather embarrassing situation gave Prussia a parliament and made the state at least a quasi-constitutional monarchy. When the 1858 elections gave control of the parliament to a liberal coalition, both monarch (now in the form of Prince William, the new Prince Regent) and the senior military took these signs as evidence that further military reforms were needed. The *Landwehr*, again, was singled out as the ultimate target.

In September 1859, Prince William appointed General Albrecht von Roon to draw up a series of proposals to reform

the military. William and von Roon were intimate friends and after receiving the General's blistering report on the state of the army in July 1858, the Prince Regent had no reservations about putting the wheels of change in motion. Von Roon's memorandum to William had specifically called for such things as an increase in the number of conscripts to be drafted each year, and the building of new military schools to support an increase in the size of the NCO and officer corps. Von Roon also complained about the lack of discipline, expertise and general military attitude (*eigentlichen richtigen festen Soldatengeist* he called it) of the militia. Von Roon's remark about attitude, however, betrays the fact that his greater problem with the *Landwehr* was quite political, and quite honestly expressed the concerns of the regular military establishment as a whole. He wrote that the fact that "every *Landwehrmann* has become an elector, thanks to our present parliamentary form of government," meant that the state could not employ the militia like a normal military force but had to consider the wishes of its members.²⁸ When von Roon's military commission finally presented the reform bill to parliament, the liberal opposition, to include Minister of War Eduard von Bonin, was absolutely livid. One Prussian official summed it up by noting that such a plan would "produce an atmosphere of distrust and hostility between the military and civil society such as existed in its fullest flower before 1806."²⁹

The battle between the crown and parliament over von Roon's military reforms raged for 8 years. By a law passed on November 9, 1867, however, it was the conservative military establishment that could claim victory, partially due to some slick political maneuvering by the state's new (and very unorthodox) Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck theorized that a "gap" existed in the Prussian constitution, such that when the parliament and throne were deadlocked, and the King had the right to take whatever steps were necessary to run the state until the problem was resolved.³⁰ Thus, the crown appropriated the necessary money and nearly all of the reforms suggested by von Roon were enacted, proving their military worth in the war against France some 3 years later. Importantly, they continued the revolutionary idea that the army existed, not to fight wars, but to train the nation to fight

wars. They would also become the basis for the structure of the German army until after World War I, and the basis for military reform throughout the world.

Von Roon's reforms established the permanent structure of the Prussian military (and those armies allied to it as members of the North German Confederation) as a "reserve army." By his reforms the strength of the active field army was increased to 315,526 men with the number of combat units more than doubled. The number of infantry regiments jumped to 118, for example. The mobilized strength of the army, however, was 551,993 for the field army and a *further* 392,328 for use as garrison and logistics troops. The reserve component of the army provided nearly all the garrison and lines of communications troops, as well as about half of the regular infantry and artillery. The reserves could also field some combat formations to supplement the regular army when necessary. And when combined with the efficiency of the general staff and a modernized railway system, all of this could be in the field in 14 days.³¹

Under the reforms each unit (normally a regiment) of the standing army was given the responsibility of conscripting and training soldiers from the district in which the unit was physically located. A young man was drafted at age 20 and served for 3 years on active duty with his local ("hometown") regiment. At the end of 3 years he could request retention on active duty or accept release, in which case he would be placed in that regiment's reserve pool for the next 4 years. As part of the army's formal reserve, he was liable to be mobilized as part of his regiment in time of national emergency. Very likely he would rejoin the same company in which he served on active duty. Otherwise he was obligated to rejoin his regiment over the next 4 years for two training periods, each up to 8 weeks long. His regiment had total responsibility for his training and military competence. If desired, the reserve soldier could voluntarily participate in further training periods to gain promotion as an NCO in the reserves. There were no differences in status or privileges between an active or reserve soldier.³²

In reality, the army's formal reserves took the place of the old first levy of the *Landwehr*. Under normal circumstances only about 40 men per cavalry regiment (676 men) were reservists. However almost 50 percent of the infantry and 40 percent of the artillery were part-time soldiers. A regular infantry battalion of 1,050 men usually counted just over 500 men as reservists, while artillery companies normally used not only reservists, but also men in their first year of duty in the *Landwehr* to bring their units up to strength.³³

The *Landwehr* still existed under von Roon's reforms, but now under total regular army control and with a much diminished field combat mission. In doing so Prussian authorities sought not only to instill the "proper" attitude into the typical *Landwehrmann*, but his reduced combat role also lessened him as a threat to the King. Unlike the army's reserves, the *Landwehr* provided actual military units. These units were generally logistics, line of communications, and garrison formations. The *Landwehr* could also provide combat formations if necessary, however, and did so quite successfully during the Franco-Prussian War.³⁴ Normally, regular army officers commanded the larger sized *Landwehr* formations.

The soldiers of the *Landwehr* were reservists who had completed their fourth year. By law they were required to serve an additional 5 years in the *Landwehr*. In keeping with the regional nature of the Prussian army, the militia unit in which the soldier served was local and in the same district administered by the active army unit in which he served. He was liable for periodic training for periods of up to 2 weeks each. Again, this training was conducted by, and was the responsibility of, the local active component military unit. The *Landwehrmann* could voluntarily serve further training periods, normally with his old regular regiment, in hopes of qualifying for promotion.³⁵

Young men commissioned as officers in the Prussian army followed a pattern strikingly similar to the enlisted soldier. The officer would serve 3 years on active duty, and, unless retained on active duty (his and the army's decision), he would join his regiment's reserve for 4 years. He was obligated to three

periods of training, each up to 8 weeks long, with his regiment during his reserve time, though he could volunteer for additional training time for promotion qualification. The officer could also request extension in his regiment's reserve, but not to exceed 12 years. After his tour with the reserves, he joined his local *Landwehr* unit for 5 years. The officer's service pattern in the militia followed that of the enlisted soldier.³⁶

While this reserve system was, as early as 1860, severely criticized by nations with more professional armies, the criticism abruptly stopped after the trouncing of France in 1871.³⁷ Nothing convinces like success and after the Franco-Prussian War nearly every major power (except, notably, the United States, despite the best efforts of General Emory Upton in his theories of the "expansible army") across the globe adopted the Prussian system. The system provided a means to field very large and very well trained armies at an acceptable cost. The system, because of its regional nature and its necessary use of reserves, mobilized public support for the military in war, if not for the war policy itself. Tragically, these very aspects would soon doom the Western Front of World War I to become a 4-year bloodbath, much more than the machinegun. With the ability to put large numbers of troops in the field quickly, coupled with the small stretch of territory between Switzerland and the English Channel, every centimeter of front could be occupied by a trained soldier in a trench. Maneuver was lost and the armies could do little except plunge straight ahead into bloody carnage.

Today, however, history has come full circle. Force planners the world over are looking for methods to provide adequate defense without breaking the budget, and while taking advantage of the peace dividend delivered by the end of the cold war. It is interesting to note that the present Federal German Army, due to its treaty obligations, is now reducing its size and looking to convert to a "training army" as opposed to a "fighting army."³⁸ Many of the proposals for this "reserve army" would not be unfamiliar to tough old generals like Albrecht von Roon or his Prince Regent. For our own army, like that of one of our major allies, the Prussian reserve

structure indeed has much to teach. Caution must be used however, for while the Prussian experience provides much to copy, there are things to avoid as well.

Criticisms, Conclusions and Recommendations.

The first thing that one might notice about the Prussian reserve system is that several facets of the institution simply would not work in the United States. The United States is a democracy while, for most of its history, Prussia was an autocratic monarchy. This fact allowed the central government to institute changes without the advice and consent of its people. Things would not be so easy in the modern United States. From a purely military standpoint several things about the way Prussia formed her reserves would cause quite a stir within the American military, much less the general populace. Few officers, Active or Reserve Component, seem to like the idea of using reserve soldiers as "fillers" for active duty units, particularly active combat units. The Reserve Components would surely balk at the idea of having Active Component officers in charge of their larger formations. Universal conscription would find few supporters anywhere.

A potentially more touchy issue, however, is the Prussian treatment of their *Landwehr*, a component which (very) roughly corresponds to this country's National Guard. Force planners who consider the Prussian model should recall that the Germans stripped power from the *Landwehr* (thus "federalizing" their entire reserve structure) for more political reasons than ones military. One should remember crusty old General Albrecht von Roon snarling, "every *Landwehrmann* has become an elector, thanks to our present parliamentary form of government," noting that the state could no longer employ the militia without considering the opinions of the people who made it up.³⁹ Such a statement flies in the face of traditional American thinking, both political and military, on the issue. For while the competency of the U.S. Reserve Component is still a hotly debated topic, most involved people acknowledge the political wisdom of the Total Army concept as created in 1972 by General Creighton W. Abrams. This program came as a result of the chaos of the Vietnam conflict

and sought to meld the Active and Reserve Components into a cohesive whole. Noted military writer Colonel Harry G. Summers explained:

By incorporating reserve combat brigades into active-Army divisions, Gen Abrams sought to eliminate the disastrous Vietnam War fallacy that wars could be fought "in cold blood" without paying the political price for national mobilization. It was precisely what many saw as the reserves' greatest weakness—their political sensitivity—that Gen Abrams recognized as their greatest strength. Unlike the draft, which had degenerated into a national disgrace, the reserve forces, he believed, represented the true bridge between the active force and the American people.⁴⁰

General Abrams was correct in his evaluation of the reserves on this point, but his conclusions hit home particularly hard with the Army National Guard. Because the Guard is a State institution and because it is often used in support of State and local community projects, whether disaster relief or the use of the armory as a community basketball center, many believe that the Guard represents a more grass roots, "people's" military force than other Federal reserve forces. Further, the National Guard fields a much higher proportion of combat units than does the U.S. Army Reserve, creating a perception that Guardsmen are much more likely to be shot at when deployed (the Gulf War's Scud tragedy notwithstanding). Thus when the National Guard goes to war, not only does public support tag along with them, but public consent for their deployment instantly becomes a paramount issue. Congressman Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, recently noted this and bluntly wrote, "A president should not be able to involve the United States in a large protracted military adventure without making the case for it to the American people. If the Guard is involved in a significant way, that means the case will have to be made."⁴¹ This point, coupled with the National Guard's very significant State mission (and force structure must be maintained to support this) and the traditional public apprehension over a large Federal military, would seem to make a mass Prussian "federalization" of the Guard unwise politically and philosophically.⁴²

Despite these potential problems, there is still much to learn from the Prussian experience. Their reserve system did ultimately accomplish exactly what it set out to do. It enabled the small German state to field a large, well trained army at an acceptable cost. This in itself indicates that a large force structure based on reserve forces, to include reserve combat units, is a viable alternative. In the case of Prussia, careful analysis shows the following factors to be the most significant reasons why their reserve program was so successful:

- *Regional Organization.* The Prussian military system was formed around both reserve and active units which were stationed in and drew their manpower from a specific geographic portion of the state. This fostered a relationship between the military and the people which promoted public support when the "hometown" unit went to war. This, in turn, assisted the military in the morale building efforts that went into the training of the troops. The idea is not unlike the present day regional orientation of the British system (i.e., the 23d Regiment, Royal Welsh Fusiliers) and as General Crosbie E. Saint noted of the Gulf War, "The moral ascendancy that US troops had when they knew their country was behind them can not be discounted."⁴³
- *Reserve and Active Force Integration.* The Prussian military system was structured such that, except for small contingencies, war could not be waged without the mobilization of the reserves. This, as noted above, provided for public support from the people, if not for war policy, then at least for the soldiers who were to execute it. It also mandated the need to insure that the reserves were ready for war at all times. This, in turn, necessitated that standards for performance had to be the same whether the soldier was a reservist or a regular. As Prussian military commanders knew that reservists would be part of their force regardless, the enforcement of these standards became critically important. It meant that as a matter of military survival, the reserve and active soldiers had to be

essentially interchangeable, like the parts of a rifle. The integration of the two components also reduced friction between active and reserve soldiers. By law, every member of the Prussian military knew that he would probably be a reserve and militia soldier at some point in his career. Thus, there was little reason for jealousy. Indeed, in 19th century Prussia it was considered a great honor to be able to say, "*Ich bin ein Hauptmann der Reserve!*"

- *Active Component Training.* The total integration of the active component with its military reserve requires that the reservists or militiamen be nearly as competent as the regulars. The Prussians accomplished this by assigning the total responsibility for the training of a district's reserves to the regular army unit stationed there. Since the local regular unit commander would go to war with these same reservists, he naturally had a vested interest in insuring that the training was done properly and that mandated common standards were met. Because, the reservists and militia had little to do in the time-consuming effort required to plan training, they could make the most of every minute available for military drill. This was particularly true for the *Landwehr*, who fielded not just fillers, but regular military units instead.
- *Experience.* To insure quality standards for their reserve soldiers and units, the Prussians used a "flow through" system in obtaining their reserve and militia soldiers. No one could enter the reserves without 3 years of active military service, whether officer or enlisted. No one could then enter the *Landwehr* without at least 4 years as a reservist to a regular army unit. Such a system not only provides active duty know-how to reserve units, but it also serves to insure the retention of initial training skills and, again, helps shatter any jealousy between the reservist and active soldier. The Prussians were absolutely convinced that a soldier who had practiced his military

skills on active duty made a better reservist or *Landwehrmann*, than one who had not. The campaign of 1870 seemed to back up that conclusion.

The items listed above should not be perceived as detailed guidance, but general principles. As such they hit home in several ways, specifically in regards to Reserve Component readiness. For example, the amount of time spent by typical National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve units in tending to administrative and planning tasks is quite large and, from personal experience, certainly detracts from the time available for training. For training to be provided, in total, by the Active Component would certainly mean not only more training time available, but also training of a quality that should theoretically be on a par with Active Component units. This would particularly be the case once the realization hits home that, come hell or high water, these same reserve units would be deployed alongside the active unit training them when the shooting started.

Likewise, the Prussian flow-through system could well provide at least a partial solution to the current problem of too few prior service personnel in the reserves, a vexing issue which many feel particularly plagues the National Guard. Leadership problems were, rightly or wrongly, singled out in the aborted call-up of the Roundout Brigades during Operation DESERT STORM, and some think it no coincidence that only 45 percent of National Guard officers and 38 percent of National Guard enlisted have had more than 2 years active duty experience.⁴⁴ Also the soothing effect that a flow-through program would have on traditional Reserve-Active Component friction is obvious, and could well bring the reality of the Total Army concept much closer to fruition. The benefits concerning public support have already been touched upon.

Admittedly, modifying America's military system to partially duplicate that of Prussia will be require some serious overhauling and will be painfully slow. In the case of the flow-through system, for example, there will be a need to begin at the lowest levels of the officer and enlisted personnel structure, and it will be years before these soldiers move on to positions of greater responsibility in the reserves. Filling the reserves'

mid-level and senior-level positions with soldiers who have active duty experience is possible, but not immediately easy. Attrition would be the only equitable way to accomplish this, and care must be taken to insure that reservists who lack active duty experience are given a fair opportunity to advance their careers as well. Career programs may well have to be redone, for Reservists and Guardsmen in particular. All of this will take a great deal of time and this points out the fact that even a partial adoption of the Prussian model should be considered a long-range planning goal.

But even this will only become possible, however, if one other important aspect becomes a reality. That is the conversion of an all too prevalent attitude that looks upon the active army as solely a fighting force to a mindset that recognizes its additional mission as a national training force as well. Note that a complex reserve system such as Prussia's only worked well when all of its components worked together. No one facet was independent of another, no one facet could work alone. If one aspect failed, the system failed. It was a system that integrated many different concepts into a workable whole because of the Prussian military's willingness to accept the fact that the army existed not only to fight and win wars, but to train the nation for war as well. This only happened because Prussian generals were willing to make the mental conversion from the era of Frederick the Great to a time more modern in its outlook. It is interesting to note that times have changed and Germany, once again, has changed with them, publicly announcing a desire to convert to a "training army."⁴⁵

One recommendation for the present day American army is to make that same mental conversion, at least to the point where other concepts are rationally considered. U.S. military force planners should not whole heartedly adopt the German system, to be sure. There will always be a need for active forces capable of responding immediately to short notice contingencies. Missions such as Operation JUST CAUSE or URGENT FURY require well trained fighting forces that are totally in being now. Indeed, many postulate that the post-cold

war, with threats that are more diffuse and seemingly less determable, is likely to require increased capabilities for rapid crisis response.

But the world is a fickle place and one can not guarantee a future of only short, small "police actions." Deployments requiring a relatively long build-up time, such as Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, are still a distinct possibility. Such military actions are vastly different from crisis response and may well be suited to a reserve army concept. Thus, the system developed by Prussia potentially provides many answers plaguing these same force planners embroiled in the Reserve-Active Component debate. We recommend that the system be objectively studied, jointly by both the Active and Reserve Components. Those items which don't fit the American way of war should be rejected, those which do adopted and fused into a workable whole. The secret of success will lie in determining what fits and what does not. Considering all alternatives, such as the ones presented here, is the first step. The result could very well be an armed forces structure that fits the nation's needs in all respects, to include economic considerations. Certainly, the future of the nation, and its military, deserve nothing less.

ENDNOTES

1. Richard Gabriel, from a statement made in a lecture attended by the author on May 7, 1992.
2. General Vincent J. Esposito and Colonel John R. Elting, *A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars*, London: Arms & Armour Press, 1980, p. 68.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Peter Hofschroer, *Prussian Line Infantry, 1792-1815*, London: Osprey Publishing, 1984, p. 6.
5. Peter Hofschroer, *Prussian Reserve, Militia and Irregular Troops, 1806-1815* (hereafter abbreviated *Prussian Reserve*), London: Osprey Publishing, 1987, p. 5.
6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*

8. Trevor N. Dupuy, *A Genius for War: The German Army and the General Staff, 1807-1945*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977, p. 32. Historians generally believe that Yorck's action was a deliberate attempt to force the timid Prussian King into a war with France whether he liked it or not.

9. Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955, p. 60.

10. Hofschorer, *Prussian Reserve*, pp. 6-9.

11. Craig, p. 60.

12. F. N. Maude, *1806. The Jena Campaign*. London: G. Allen & Co., 1909, p. 58.

13. Craig, on page 40, noted Prussian Prime Minister Freiherr von Stein's comments on the issue. Stein was a supporter of Scharnhorst and wrote,

The chief idea was to arouse a moral, religious and patriotic spirit in the nation to instil into it again courage, confidence, readiness for every sacrifice in behalf of independence from foreigners and for the national honor, and to seize the first favorable opportunity to begin the bloody and hazardous struggle.

14. Hofschorer, *Prussian Reserve*, p. 33.

15. *Ibid.* p. 7.

16. Peter Hofschorer, *Prussian Landwehr and Landsturm, 1813-1815*. Cambridge, Ont: RCAF, 1984, p. 5. Normally the officers chosen to lead the *Landwehr* were retired military officers or officers released from active service due to the force reductions of 1808. Often officers from the *Freiwilliger* battalions (volunteer units raised and trained at private expense for service to the crown) were used to augment the militia. The *Landsturm* ("landstorm") were local defense units hastily formed to protect the nearby area from French marauders or deserters.

17. Hofschorer, *Prussian Reserve*, p. 34.

18. *Ibid.* p. 36.

19. *Ibid.* p. 37.

20. Craig, pp. 60-61.

21. Michael Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War*. New York: Methuen, 1981, p. 11; Fred W. Merten, *The Prussian National Defense System*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1939, p. 19.

22. *Ibid.* Howard, p. 11.

23. Craig, p. 74.

24. *Ibid.*

25. Lieutenant Gerald F. Talbot, 2d Prussian Guard Dragoons, *Analysis of the Organization of the Prussian Army*. London: Trubner & Co., 1871, pp. 12-13.

26. Craig, p. 74.

27. *Ibid.* p. 75. War Minister Hermann von Boyen, a reformer, resigned over the incident. A young officer named Carl von Clausewitz noted this and wrote, "I do not think it right to yield the battlefield so completely to the men of 1806." His views on the matter are evident.

28. *Ibid.* p. 140.

29. *Ibid.* p. 153.

30. Dupuy, p. 69.

31. Talbot, pp. 56-67.

32. *Ibid.* pp. 21-23.

33. *Ibid.* pp. 57-62.

34. Joseph Miranda, "The Franco-Prussian War," *Strategy & Tactics*, February 1992, p. 13. The Prussians fielded the Guards, 1st Pommeranian, 2d Brandenburg, and 3d West Prussian/Posen *Landwehr* Infantry Divisions during the war.

35. Talbot, p. 22. Admittedly, some regular army units neglected the training of their *Landwehr*.

36. *Ibid.* pp. 38-41.

37. Howard, p. 18. Howard notes, "Indeed the French, at this period, hardly thought of the Prussian forces as an army at all. In the French army it was widely considered to be 'a training school of the *Landwehr*.'"

38. Briefing to USAREUR on July 29, 1991, by the G-3, German Federal Army Field Trials Working Group.

39. Craig, p. 140.
40. Harry G. Summers, "Risky Reserve Retreat." *The Washington Times*, April 2, 1992, p. G-1.
41. Congressman Les Aspin, *News Release*, May 11, 1992, pp. 1-2.
42. Donald M. Snow, *National Security, Enduring Problems in a Changing Defense Environment*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991, pp. 28-31.
43. Summers, p. G-1.
44. Congressman Les Aspin, "Memorandum to Members, Committee on Armed Services, RE: Combat Power from the Reserve Component," May 7, 1992, p. 5.
45. Briefing to USAREUR on July 29, 1991. Limited by treaty to a total armed forces strength of some 370,000 men, the Germans believe their system will be able to mobilize an army of over 900,000 in just a few days.

APPENDIX A

Prussian Reserve Integration in War: The Organization of the Prussian II Corps, 1813

Commanding General: LTG von Kleist
Chief of Staff: COL von Tippelskirch

9th Brigade (MG von Klux)	11th Reserve Regt, 2403 men
1st Westprussian Inf Regt, 2805 men	10th Silesian Landwehr Inf Regt, 2130 men
6th Reserve Regt, 2217 men*	1st Silesian Landwehr Cav Regt, 453 men
7th Silesian Landwehr Inf Regt, 2751 men	Six pd Foot Btty No 13. 136 men. 8 guns
Silesian Rifle Bn (2 cos). 400 men	
Neumark Dragoon Regt. 646 men	
Six pd Foot Batty No 7. 137 men. 8 guns	
10th Brigade (MG von Pirch I)	Reserve Cavalry (MG von Roeder)
2d Westprussian Inf Regt. 3468 men	COL von Starkenfel's Bde: Silesian Lancer and National Cav Regts. 2d Silesian Hussar Regt. 1295 men
7th Reserve Regt, 2413 men	COL von Wrangel's Bde: East Prussian and Silesian Kurassier Regts. 1321 men
9th Silesian Landwehr Inf Regt, 2477 men	COL von Mutius' Bde: 7th and 8th Silesian Landwehr Cav Regts, 982 men
2d Silesian Landwehr Cav Regt, 548 men	Horse Batteries Nos 6 an 7. 288 men. 16 guns
Six pd Foot Bty No 14. 138 men. 8 guns	
11th Brigade (MG von Ziethen)	Corps Artillery (Col von Braun)
1st Silesian Inf Regt. 2719 men	12 pd Foot Batteries 3 and 6. 394 men. 16 guns
10th Reserve Regt, 2403 men	Six pd Foot Batteries Nos 8, 11 and 21. 433 men
8th Silesian Landwehr Inf Regt, 2437 men	Seven pd Howitzer Btty No 1. 164 men. 8 pieces
Silesian Rifle Bn (2 cos). 394 men	Three munitions. one repair company
1st Silesian Hussar Regt. 707 men	Engineer Cos 6 and 7. 162 men
Six pd Foot Bty No 9. 137 men. 8 guns	
12th Brigade (LTG Prince August)	
2d Silesian Inf Regt. 2511 men	

*Bolded units are Reserve or Militia formations.

APPENDIX B

Prussian Reserve Integration in War: The Organization of the Prussian II Corps, 1870

Commanding General: General of Infantry von Franseckh
Chief of Staff: COL von Wichmann

3d Inf Div (MG von Hartmann)

5th Bde (MG von Koblinski)
Grenadier Regt No 2*

Inf Regt No 42

6th Bde(MG von der Decken)

Inf Regt No 14

Inf Regt No 54

Rifle Bn No 2

Dragoon Regt No 2**

Field Artillery Regt No 2,
two heavy and two light
batteries, 24 guns

**Engineer Co No 1 with Bridge
Train**

4th Inf Div (LTG von Weihern)

7th Bde (MG du Trossel)

Grenadier Regt No 9

Inf Regt No 49

8th Bde (MG von Kettler)

Inf Regt No 21

Inf Regt No 61

Dragoon Regt No 11

Field Artillery Regt No 2,
two heavy and two light
batteries, 24 guns

Engineer Cos Nos 2 and 3

Corps Artillery (COL Petzel)

Field Artillery Regt No 2,
two batteries each of horse,
heavy foot and light foot
artillery, 36 guns

Munitions Companies: Five
artillery, four infantry
plus one pontoon train

*Bolded formations had
theoretically between 40 and 70%
of their strength in reserve soldiers.
Further, the entire corps was from
the province of Pommerania. Thus
Inf Rgt No 14 was also the 3d
Pommeranian Inf Regt, etc.

** Prussian cavalry regiments
traditionally were kept up to nearly
full strength, with very few mobilizable
Reservists

APPENDIX C

Prussian Reserve Integration in War: The Organization of the Prussian 1st Landwehr Division, 1870

Commanding General: MG von Treskow

General Staff Officer: CPT von Schullendorf

Adjutant: CPT Stoermer (IR 43)*

Adjutant: 1LT Vassewitz (IR 2)

1st Bde (COL von Buddenbrock)

Adjutant: 1LT von Studnitz (IR 49)

1st Combined Landwehr Regt (from Regts 14 and 21)

2d Combined Landwehr Regt (from Regts 21 and 54)

2d Bde (MG von Abemann)

Adjutant: 1LT von Naundorf (IR 93)

3d Combined Landwehr Regt (from Regts 26 and 61)

4th Combined Landwehr Regt (from Regts 61 and 66)

2d Reserve Lancer Regt

Artillery (MAJ Weigelt from the 9th Artillery Bde):

Three Light Reserve Batteries from II and IX Corps

1st Fortress Engineer Company from II Corps

*The designation in parentheses refers to the line regiment from whence the officer came. Thus IR 43 is Infantry Regiment 43 (6th Eastprussian). All of the militia units in this division were from Pommerania.

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